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PROMOTING GENERIC DRUG
AVAILABILITY: REFORMING THE HATCH-
WAXMAN ACT TO PREVENT
UNNECESSARY DELAYS TO CONSUMERS
LAURA GILESt
INTRODUCTION
The cost of prescription drugs has skyrocketed in the past
decade.1  The increase is partially attributed to the costs
associated with the extensive research a drug must undergo
before it can be made available to consumers. 2 As a result of
these price increases, many consumers can no longer afford vital
prescription drugs.3 Furthermore, generic drugs, which are less
expensive than their brand name counterparts, are taking a
t J.D. Candidate, June 2002, St. John's University School of Law; B.A., Hofstra
University.
I See Michael B. Moore, "Open Wide (Your Pocketbook That Is!)"-A Call for the
Establishment In the United States of a Prescription Drug Price Regulatory Agency,
1 Sw. J. L. & TRADE AM. 149 (1994) (citing the STAFF OF SENATE SPECIAL COMM. ON
AGING, 103D CONGRESS, IST SESS., EARNING A FAILING GRADE: A REPORT CARD ON
1992 DRUG MANUFACTURER PRICE INFLATION 1 (Comm. Print 1993) (stating that
there is a 128.4% inflation rate for pharmaceuticals versus 21.7% for general overall
inflation)). The author predicted that if this rate of inflation continued, a drug
costing $20 in 1994 would cost $120 dollars in 2000. Id. In general there is a fifteen
percent annual rise in drug prices. See Let Drugmakers Compete; Suffering the Most
are Those Chronically Infirm Without Insurance That Covers Drugs, MIAMI HERALD,
Aug. 22, 2000. The United States is the last free market for pharmaceuticals. This
means that Americans typically pay higher prices for new medication than people
anywhere else in the developed world. See Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Jeff Gerth,
Keeping Down the Competition; How Companies Stall Generics And Keep
Themselves Healthy, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 2000, at 1.
2 See generally Joseph P. Reid, Note, A Generic Drug Price Scandal: Too Bitter
A Pill for the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act to Swallow?,
75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 309, 330-31 & n.126 (1999) (discussing the reasons that
research and development costs are continually increasing).
3 See Stolberg & Gerth, supra note 1. The couple profiled in the article is on an
income fixed at $1,261 a month in Social Security benefits. The cost of their
prescription drugs is $148 a month. The cost of the prescription drugs amounts to
one-tenth of their income and imposes considerable financial hardship on the
couple. Id.
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longer time to become available and are facing dramatic price
increases. 4 Is there any way that a drug company can perform
its research while keeping market prices lower? Perhaps.
The purpose of this Note is to explore some of the obstacles
that pioneer pharmaceutical companies create to prevent generic
pharmaceuticals from getting to the market. The
pharmaceutical companies' tactics include patent infringement
suits and secondary patents, pioneer acquisition of generic drug
companies, and collusion between pioneer companies and generic
companies to keep generic drugs off the market. This Note will
examine the drug approval process for both pioneer and generic
pharmaceuticals, with a particular focus on the Hatch-Waxman
Act5 (the "Act"). Finally, it will examine possible reforms in the
pharmaceutical industry that may prevent companies from
engaging in these tactics.
I. DRUG APPROVAL PROCESS
A. Pioneer Approval Process
The approval process for a new drug is extremely time
consuming.6 No new drug may enter the U.S. market without
approval from the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) as to its
safety and efficacy.7  The process begins after a drug
manufacturer has completed an initial laboratory research
4 In 1998, generic drug prices increased 3000%. See Definitely a Cause of
Anxiety, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 24, 1998, at B8.
5 Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No.
98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 68b-68c, 70b (1994); 21 U.S.C.
§§ 301, 355, 360cc (1994); 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1994); 35 U.S.C. §§ 156, 271, 282
(1994)).
6 See Richard J. Findlay, Symposium Issue-Striking the Right Balance
Between Innovation and Drug Price Competition: Understanding the Hatch-Waxman
Act: Originator Drug Development, 54 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 227, 227 (1999) (noting
that the entire approval process can take fourteen to sixteen years but is subject to
substantial variability). The Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2000),
governs the new drug approval process.
7 See 21 U.S.C. § 321 (1994); see also Patricia I. Carter, Federal Regulation of
Pharmaceuticals in the United States and Canada, 21 LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J.
215, 229 (1999). See generally 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1)(A); 21 C.F.R. § 56. "Prior to
1962, drugs were approved for safety only"-there was no efficacy requirement.
Gerald J. Mossinghoff, Symposium Issue-Striking the Right Balance Between
Innovation and Drug Price Competition: Understanding the Hatch-Waxman Act,
Overview of the Hatch-Waxman Act and Its Impact on the Drug Development
Process, 54 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 187, 187 (1999).
[Vol.75:357
20011 PROMOTING DRUG AVALABILITY 359
program that can take thirty to fifty-seven months to complete.8
If the pioneer company believes that the pre-clinical testing
shows that the drug may help to treat a certain condition, it may
" sponsor" the drug and file a Notice of Claimed Investigational
Exemption for a New Drug (IND) with the FDA.9 If there is no
objection from the FDA, the drug is labeled "investigational new
drug" and clinical trials may commence thirty days after filing.10
The approval process has four phases." Three of these
phases are completed during the clinical testing period. The
three phases of clinical testing can often take up to nine years. 12
Once these three phases have been completed the pioneer
company or "sponsor" submits a New Drug Application (NDA).13
"The NDA has become the principal regulatory device for
controlling pharmaceutical companies in the United States."14
The NDA requires that the sponsor provide extensive documents
demonstrating the safety and efficacy of the drug.15 The FDA
thoroughly reviews these documents for "clinical, chemical,
statistical, and pharmacological" evidence that the drug is
effective and safe.16 A "full review can take years."17
8 See Findlay, supra note 6.
9 See Carter, supra note 7, at 231. ("This IND application provides notice that
clinical (human) trials will be conducted, contains information about the pre-clinical
results, outlines the proposed clinical studies, identifies experienced clinical
investigators who will conduct the trials and provides other information about the
manufacturing and testing processes.")
10 See id. at 230-31. Clinical trials essentially mean that a manufacture is
allowed to test the drug on human subjects. Prior research was conducted on
animals.
11 See Findlay, supra note 6. The four stages are: () safety, where clinical
testing is conducted on a limited number of people to establish the safety of various
doses; (II) efficacy, where the drug is tested for effectiveness on a small group of
patients; (III) side-effects and long term use effects, where the drug is assessed for
safety and effectiveness in wider clinical use; and (IV) post approval, where the drug
company continues to test the newly-approved drug for adverse reactions and- is
obligated to report the nature and frequency of any reactions. Id.; see also Jeffrey &
N. Gibbs & Bruce F. Mackler, Food and Drug Administration Regulation and
Products Liability: Strong Sword, Weak Shield, 22 TORT & INS. L.J. 194, 204 (1987).
12 See Findlay, supra note 6 (stating that phase I may take from 10 to 18
months; phase I[ may take from 21 to 35 months; phase III may take from 28 to 55
months).
1 See generally 21 U.S.C. § 355(b) (1994); 21 C.F.R. §§ 56, 314 (2000).
14 Carter, supra note 7, at 232.
15 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(d) (1994); 21 C.F.R. § 314.50 (2000); see also Gibbs &
Mackler, supra note 11, at 205.
16 Id. (stating that companies often have to provide additional information to
the FDA).
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Once the drug receives approval from the FDA, the pioneer
company may market it in the United States.'8 At this point, the
pioneer company has expended a great deal of money on
research in an effort to get this new drug approved for
marketing. 19 The pioneer company, however, will quickly regain
their investment through their exclusive sale of the drug.20 The
pioneer company will seek to retain exclusive control over the
drug for as long as possible in order to maximize profits. To
maintain exclusive control, the pioneer company uses several
tactics to extend or manipulate the period of exclusivity it has
been given.21 To understand the period of exclusivity the pioneer
company obtains, it is necessary to examine the patent of a
pioneer pharmaceutical.
In general, a federal patent grants the patent holder the
right to exclude others from using a patented invention for a
twenty-year term from the date of filing.22  "For products
requiring government regulatory approval prior to marketing,
such as drugs and medical devices, the length of the term often
17 Id. Another method is known as a "rolling" NDA, which speeds up the
approval process. With a "rolling" NDA, the company does not file an application,
but discusses the submission and resubmission with the FDA. When the company
does file an NDA, it essentially has a perfect file, which the FDA can quickly
approve. See Findlay, supra note 6, at 228. The average approval time for NDAs
submitted in 1997 was 15 months. See Carter, supra note 7, at 234 (citing The FDA
Modernization Act of 1997, Pub L. No. 105-115, available at http://www.fda.gov/
opacomlbackgrounderslmodact/htm (last visited July 10, 2001)).
18 See Carter, supra note 7, at 233. The drug may still be classified as a new
drug for many years. Phase IV research takes place at this time. Id.
19 See Michael P. VanHuysen, Reform of the New Drug Approval Process, 49
ADMIN. L. REV. 477, 478-79 (1997). In the United States, it takes between $300 and
$500 million for a single drug to complete the FDA approval process. See id.; see also
Stolberg & Gerth, supra note 1 (describing the tactics employed by designer drug
companies to acquire patents).
20 See How INCREASED COMPETITION FROM GENERIC DRUGS HAS AFFECTED
PRICES AND RETURNS IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY, Fig. 3 and accompanying
text, available at http://www.cbo.gov/showdoc.cfm?index=655&sequence=4&from=5
(last visited July 11, 2001).
21 For example, designer drug companies have filed lawsuits for infringement,
which under the Act prevents a generic drug company's application from being
approved for 30 months. See Alfred E. Engelberg, Special Patent Provisions for
Pharmaceuticals: Have They Outlived Their Usefulness? A Political, Legislative and
Legal History of United States Law and Observations for the Future, 39 J.L. TECH
389 (1999).
22 35 U.S.C. § 154(b) (1994). Recently, in 1995, the term was changed from 17
years to 20 years as a result of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No.
103-465, §532, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994) (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 301 (1994)).
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is altered."23 If the term were not altered, the patent would have
substantially less value because the patent holder cannot sell its
product during this approval period. This loss of patent
protection as a result of regulatory delay is referred to as "front
end distortion."24 One of the purposes of the Hatch-Waxman Act
was to remedy such distortions.25 To reduce front-end distortion,
the Act extended patent terms for products that are subject to
regulatory delays for up to five years.26
B. Generic Approval Process
A generic drug is a copy of a name brand drug whose patent
or period of exclusivity has expired.27 It typically costs much less
than the brand name version.28 The generic drug approval
process varies greatly from that of new pioneer drugs. The
Hatch-Waxman Act 29 is the leading legislation governing the
generic drug approval process.30 The Act serves two purposes:
2 David J. Bloch, If It's Regulated Like a Duck... Uncertainties in
Implementing the Patent Exceptions of the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term
Restoration Act, 54 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 111, 111 (1999).
24 Id. at 112. There is also "back end distortion," another type of regulatory
delay created by Roche Products Inc. v. Bolar Pharmaceutical Co., 733 F.2d 858
(Fed. Cir. 1984). In Bolar, a competitor was not permitted to begin conducting
testing until the competitor's patent had run. This had the effect of delaying a
competitor for a period lasting as long as several years. Id.
25 See Mossinghoff, supra note 7, at 188. "In 1978 President Carter launched a
major domestic policy review on industrial innovation and that team recommended
patent term restoration for pharmaceuticals and any other product that required
regulatory review-to compensate for, or restore to the term of the patents time lost
in regulatory review." Id. The result of this initiative was the Hatch-Waxman
Amendment to the Food Drug and Cosmetic Act. See generally Engelberg, supra
note 21 (outlining the events leading up to the passage of the amendment).
26 See 35 U.S.C. § 156 (1994). This was done to "create a significant, new
incentive which would result in increased expenditures for research and
development, and ultimately in more innovative drugs." Ralph A. Lewis, The
Emerging Effects of the Drug Price Competition and Restoration Act of 1984, 8 J.
CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 361, 372-73 (1992) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 98-857,
98th Cong., 2d Sess., pt 1, at 18, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C-A.N 2647, 2651). The Act
also amended 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) to prevent back end distortion. This amendment
is called the "Bolar exemption." See infra note 51.
27 See Justina A. Molzon, The Generic Drug Approval Process, 5 The J.
PHARMACY & L. 275, 275 (1995).
28 See Lewis, supra note 26, at 366 (discussing how switching to a generic
version of a drug can save a consumer thirty to fifty percent).
29 Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L.
No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 68b-68c, 70b (1994); 21
U.S.C. §§ 301, 355, 360cc (1994); 2201 (1994); 35 U.S.C. §§ 156, 271, 282 (1994)).
30 Prior to 1984, when the Act was passed, there was no process for approving
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(1) to "reduce health care costs by making generic drugs
available more rapidly," and (2) to "foster new innovations in
drug treatment by granting back patent protection for time lost
during the process of drug approval by the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA)."3' In addition, the Act also had the effect
of increasing competition.32
The generic drug development process begins by targeting a
brand name drug whose patent is going to expire within three to
five years.33 A generic drug company may then submit an
Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA) to the FDA as long
as it has met the statutory criteria. 34 The ANDA must include
information to essentially show that the new drug is already a
"listed drug,"3 5 "that the active ingredient of the new drug is the
same as that of the listed drug,"36 that the new drug will be
administrated in the same manner as the listed drug,3 7 that the
new drug is "bio-equivalent" to the listed drug,38 and most
generic drugs. Manufacturers had to follow the traditional drug approval process,
which included filing an NDA and proving the safety and efficacy of the generic. See
Engelberg, supra note 21, at 393. "The Act streamlined the approval process [for
generics] by eliminating the need for sponsors to repeat duplicative, unnecessary,
expensive and ethically questionable clinical and animal research to demonstrate
the safety and efficacy of the drug product." Molzon, supra note 27, at 276.
31 Reid, supra note 2, at 309; see also Mylan Pharm., Inc. v. Shalala, 81 F.
Supp. 2d 30, 32 (D.D.C. 2000); H.R. REP. No. 98-857, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at
14, 15 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.CA.N. 2647, 2648.
32 Since the enactment of the Act, the generic drug industry's prescription drug
market share has increased from nineteen percent in 1984 to forty-three percent in
1996. See Engelberg, supra note 21, at 389-90; Lewis, supra note 26, at 365-66;
Stolberg & Gerth, supra note 1, at 15.
33 See Findlay, supra note 6, at 229. Some important aspects of the generic drug
approval process include acquiring the active ingredient, developing a formulation,
testing the product, and setting standards.
34 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (1994) (discussing the application and approval process
for abbreviated new drug applications).
31 Id. § 355(j)(2)(A)(i) (explaining that a listed drug has already been approved
for safety and effectiveness).
36 Id. § 355(j)(2)(A)(ii).
37 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)Ciii) (1994) (stating that new drugs will be
administered in the same manner with the same dosage and strength).
38 Id. § 355(j)(2)(A)(iv). A drug is considered bio-equivalent under ANDA if-
(i) the rate and extent of absorption of the drug do not show a significant
difference from the rate and extent of absorption of the listed drug when
administered at the same ... dose ... ; or (ii) the extent of absorption of
the drug does not show a significant difference from the extent of
absorption of the listed drug when administered at the same...
dose.., and the difference from the listed drug in the rate of absorption of
the drug is intentional....
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importantly, the applicant must certify that "to the best of his
knowledge," (1) there has been no patent filed for the listed drug,
(2) that a patent has expired, (3) that the patent will expire on a
certain date or (4) that the patent is invalid or will not be
infringed by the new drug for which the application has been
submitted.3 9
The generic drug approval process takes three to five years,
provided there are no legal challenges. 40 The cost to a generic
drug manufacturer is substantially less than that of a pioneer
manufacturer. 41 Once the FDA has approved an ANDA, the
generic drug company has a 180-day exclusivity period whereby
no other generic company can market the generic version of the
drug.42 This 180 day exclusivity period can be triggered by the
earlier of either: (1) the day that the applicant commences
marketing the drug ("the commercial marketing trigger") or (2)
the date of a decision of a court in a patent infringement suit
holding that the patent which is the subject of the certification is
invalid or not infringed, whichever is earlier.43
The generic approval process is seldom as simple and
straightforward as it seems. Generic pharmaceutical companies
face many obstacles before introducing a generic drug into the
market. An example of one of these obstacles is the unnecessary
interference by pioneer companies attempting to retain
exclusivity over a drug. The next section examines these
obstacles, and other ways generics fail to reach the drug market.
Id. This is only a "safe harbor," and a company may prove bioequivalence in other
ways. See Schering Corp. v. FDA, 51 F.3d 390, 399 (3d Cir. 1995) ("The mere fact
that Congress made the establishment of bioequivalence mandatory in the Act does
not evidence an intent to limit the established testing practices of the FDA.");
Schering Corp. v. Sullivan, 782 F. Supp. 645, 648-49 (D.D.C. 1992) ("There is
simply no indication that the enumerated showings are the exclusive means for
establishing bioequivalence.").
39 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii). Patent infringement will be discussed in detail
in Part I.D. of this Note.
40 See Findlay, supra note 6, at 229. Legal battles that a generic company may
face are discussed thoroughly in the next section of this Note.
41 See Molzon, supra note 27, at 277-78. The generic drug approval process can
be conducted at a "fraction of the cost of a large clinical study" that the pioneer
company must go through. Id.
42 See 21 U.S.C. 355(j)(4)(B)(iv); see also Mylan Pharm., Inc, v. Shalala, 81 F.
Supp. 2d 30, 32-33 (D.D.C. 2000) (discussing the 180-day exclusivity period).
43 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv). For a firther discussion see John F. Resek,
Comment, Biovail v. Hoechst Aktiengesellschaft, Inc.: An Analysis Under the
Sherman Act and the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine, 10 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP.
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 571, 573 (2000).
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C. Keeping the Generics Off the Market
The stakes are very high for a pioneer drug company when
its patent, and ultimately its exclusivity, is set to expire. Drug
manufacturers work hard to maintain their market share in
light of the severe ramifications that a loss of exclusivity can
bring.44 "Estimates from the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers
Association (PMA) show that within one year after the
expiration of a brand-name company's patent, thirty-five percent
of the market is taken over by generic substitutes. This figure
rises to fifty percent two years following patent expiration."45
D. Patent Infringement Suits
Patent infringement is defined as making, using, offering to
sell, or selling a patented invention without authority.46 Under
the Hatch-Waxman Act, however, determining an infringement
is not as simple as it may sound.47
As discussed earlier in this Note,8 when a generic drug
manufacturer applies for an ANDA, it must certify, inter alia,
that there is no patent for the listed drug, that the patent has
expired, that the patent will expire, or that the patent is invalid
or will not be infringed.49 When a company makes a paragraph
IV certification that the patent is invalid or will not be infringed
44 On the day of the ruling against Eli Lilly in determining the patent period of
Prozac. Eli Lilly's stock plunged thirty-one percent, a loss of more than $35 billion in
market value. See Ruling Speeds Generic Process; Eli Lilly Shares Drop;
Pharmaceutical Co. Loses $35 Billion in Market Value, DALLAS MORNING NEWS,
Aug. 10, 2000, at 10D. Analysts estimate that Eli Lilly will lose about $1 billion a
year in revenue once the generic is available. See Sharon Bernstein, Ruling Could
Help Speed Cheaper Generic Prozac; Pharmaceuticals: Eli Lilly is Stung by a Court
Decision That Could Mean the Loss of $1 Billion of Revenue a Year, L.A. TIMES,
Aug. 10, 2000, at C1. "Three months after Naprosene (R) went off-patent, its
manufacturer, Syntax, lost 75% of its market to the generic brand." Mossinghoff,
supra note 7, at 191.
45 Melissa K. Davis, Note, Monopolistic Tendencies of Brand-Name Drug
Companies in the Pharmaceutical Industry, 15 J.L. & COM. 357, 365 (1995). But see
James J. Wheaton, Generic Competition and Pharmaceutical Innovation: The Drug
Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, 35 CATH. U. L. REv.
433, 468-69 (1986) (stating that a brand name manufacturer's market share is not
greatly affected by the entrance of a generic into the market).
46 See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (1994).
47 See Glaxo, Inc. v. Novopharm, Ltd., 110 F.3d 1562, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1997)
(noting that an action based solely upon the filing of an ANDA requires "a unique
type of infi-ngement analysis").
48 See supra notes 33-39 and accompanying text.
49 See supra note 39; see also 21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (1994).
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it must then notify the patent holder, as listed in the Orange
Book,50 of such certification.51 Once notified,52 the patent holder
50 The Orange Book, published by the FDA, lists all of the patents and
companies or individuals claiming to hold them. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., CTR. FOR
DRUG EVALUATION AND RESEARCH, APPROVED PRODUCTS WITH THERAPEUTIC
EQUIVALENCE EVALUATIONS (CCH 18th ed. 1998). This process is another result of
the Hatch-Waxman Amendments. Before 1984, the FDA did not consider patents as
a part of the drug approval process. The FDA does not evaluate whether the listed
patents are valid, but presumes that the patents are valid. As a result, anyone can
challenge the validity of a listed patent. See Elizabeth H. Dickinson, Symposium
Issue: Striking the Right Balance Between Innovation and Drug Price Competition:
Understanding the Hatch-Waxman Act: FDA's Role in Making Exclusivity
Determinations, 54 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 195, 196 (1999) (noting that the FDA has
been asked to look at the underlying patent claim, but refuses to because FDA
personnel are not patent experts and do not have the technical expertise to make
these assessments). A pioneer company often lists many patents for the same drug
in the Orange Book in an attempt to discourage competition. They may include
patents on the active ingredient the formulation of the drug, the tablet coating, the
color of the pill, the bottle, and so on. Furthermore, a patent holder is permitted to
list newly acquired patents on the eve of an ANDA approval. See Engelberg, supra
note 21, at 418. Since the sole purpose of these patents is often to discourage
competition, the Act says that no damages are to be awarded in the event that there
is an actual infringement. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(3) (1994). If there is an
infringement, approval of the ANDA will be delayed until the end of the patented
period. This assures the original filer the exclusivity period. See Dickinson, supra at
198. This is often referred to as the "bounty" provision. See Engelberg, supra note
21, at 405.
51 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (1994). The statute does not make it an act of
infringement to use the patented drug while performing acts solely necessary for the
preparation of the ANDA. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (1994) ("It shall not be an act of
infringement to make, use, or sell .. . a patented invention ... solely for uses
reasonably related to the development and submission of information under Federal
law which regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs .... ") (overruling Roche
Prod., Inc. v. Bolar Pharms. Co., 733 F.2d. 858 (Fed. Cir. 1984)). This provision is
referred to as the "Bolar exemption" and covers medical devices as well as drugs.
See Bloch, supra note 23, at 113. The term "reasonably related" has been
interpreted rather broadly to allow a substantial amount of use of a patented
product without finding infringement. Some of the exempt activities include
"collateral use of information," studies to evaluate the purity of the entity to be used
in clinical trials, production of commercial scale batches of the product, and
characterization studies. These activities would all be considered infringement
without the Bolar exemption. Some things not reasonably related, and therefore
inf-inging, include shipping of samples to foreign agencies and stockpiling. See
Edward V. Filardi, Symposium Issue--Striking the Right Balance Between
Innovation and Drug Price Competition: Understanding the Hatch-Waxman Act:
Patent Issues That Both Regulatory Affairs Personnel and Patent Attorneys Should
Understand, 54 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 215, 216-17 (1999).
52 The process of notifying the patent holder of a paragraph IV certification has
been problematic. The ANDA applicant must send notification by registered or
certified U.S. Mail, return receipt requested. The ANDA applicant may not use
other delivery services. See Dickinson, supra note 50, at 198.
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has forty-five days to bring an action against the applicant for
patent infringement.53 If a patentee files a patent infringement
suit, such suit suspends FDA approval until the earliest of the
expiration of the patent, a judicial resolution of the correctness of
the ANDA applicant's certification, or thirty months from the
receipt of notice. 54 In essence, this is an incentive for a pioneer
company to bring a patent infringement suit. Although the cost
of patent litigation is high, thirty more months of exclusivity
within the market is well worth the expense for many
manufacturers.55
This has led to frivolous patent infringement suits by
pioneer companies in an effort to retain market exclusivity over
a drug for periods beyond their patents.56  In order to
successfully prove that a pioneer company's infringement suit is
without merit, the generic company must demonstrate that the
patent holder has baselessly asserted that it held objectively
53 See 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2) (1994); see also Glaxo, Inc. v. Novopharm, Ltd., 110
F.3d 1562, 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
4 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii) (1994); see also Engelberg, supra note 21, at
405. This period was originally eighteen months, but the time period was increased
in the final version of the Act. H.R. REP. No. 98-857, pt. 1, at 27 (1984). Patent
litigation rarely ends before the 30-month period and the FDA may make the
approval after the 30-month period. Most manufacturers, however, are unwilling to
risk liability by bringing a generic drug product onto the market before the patent
litigation is resolved. The thirty month provision was inserted to assure the pioneer
manufacturer that its rights would not be taken away without proper adjudication.
See Glaxo, 110 F.3d at 1569; see also Engelberg, supra note 21, at 405.
55 See Resek, supra note 43, at 574; see also Engelberg, supra note 21, at 417
(stating that "[these fees are nominal as compared to the hundreds of millions of
dollars in monopoly, profits that can be earned during the thirty months a
competitor is held off the market"). The suit often involves a request for a
declaratory judgment, in which there is an application to enjoin the allegedly
infringing activity. To sustain a declaratory judgment, the party must show by a
preponderance of the evidence that the defendant is engaged in infringing activity
and there must be a refusal by the defendant to change course. See Glaxo, 110 F.3d
at 1570.
56 This is not to say that all infringement suits are frivolous. Pioneer companies
often have real claims of infringement. Compare Bristol-Meyer Squibb Co. v. Royce
Labs., 69 F.3d 1130, 1137 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (finding that Royce's paragraph IV
certification was incorrect, therefore finding an infringement) with Fla.
Breckenridge, Inc. v. Solvay Pharm., 174 F.3d 1227, 1236 (11th Cir. 1999) (finding
that the infringement suit was frivolous, but refusing to award attorney's fees
because both sides engaged in misleading conduct). "Despite the Congressional
intent of promoting competition and decreasing drug costs via the drug approval
process, aggressive strategies by innovator firms have resulted in an increase in the
number of challenges filed against generic drugs." Molzon, supra note 27, at 280
(emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
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greater patent coverage than that which was granted in
the patent.57
In 1985, Pfizer brought a patent infringement suit against
Chase, a generic drug manufacturer who was planning on
marketing a generic version of Pfizer's Procardia.58 Chase
intended to market its version at a price thirty percent lower
than that of Procardia. The two companies eventually settled
out of court, but enough time had elapsed for Pfizer to develop
and introduce a new and improved version of Procardia.59 This
enhanced version allowed Pfizer to maintain its control of the
market for Procardia. Pfizer, however, succeeded in doing this
through what was likely a baseless assertion of greater patent
coverage.
Recently, in Eli Lilly & Company v. Barr Laboratories,
Inc.,60 the court declared that Eli Lilly did not have patent
exclusivity over Prozac until 2003. Rather, the court determined
that Eli Lilly had a double patent on Prozac, the second of which
was invalid.6' Therefore, the court determined that Eli Lilly's
patent on Prozac should expire in 2001, making way for generics
two years earlier than the company anticipated.62 In essence, Eli
Lilly had two patents on substantially the same claim.63 Despite
567 See Davis, supra note 45, at 370 (citing Prof. Real Estate Investors v.
Columbia Pictures Indus. Inc., 508 U.S. 49 (1993)). The lawsuit must be objectively
baseless in the sense that no reasonable litigant could realistically expect success on
the merits. See Resek, supra note 43, at 581.
58 See Davis, supra note 45, at 370; see also FDA Approves Biovail's Procardia
XL 30 mg Dosage, 13 WORLDWIDE BIOTECH, Mar. 2001 (indicating that Procardia is
used for the treatment of hypertension and angina).
59 See Davis, supra note 45, at 370. The introduction of the new version enabled
Pfizer to cushion the negative financial impact the generic entrance would have had
on Pfizer. The new versipn of Procardia was an extended release form. See generally
Victoria Slind-Flor, Ulcer Drug Battle Erupts in Litigation, NAT'L L.J., May 23,
1994, at A6 ("As its patent expires, Tagamet's maker files novel infringement suits
against potential competitors.").
60 100 F. Supp. 2d 917, rev'd in part, aff/d in part, 222 F.3d 973 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
61 A double patent is essentially two patents that are not patentably distinct.
See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Barr Lab., 222 F.3d at 984-85.
62 The decision is on appeal. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
has nationwide authority over patent cases and its decisions are rarely reversed.
See Ruling Speeds Generic Process; Eli Lilly Shares Drop; Pharmaceutical Co. Loses
$35 Billion in Market Value, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Aug. 10, 2000, at 10D.
6 The judicially created doctrine of obviousness-type double patenting prohibits
a party from obtaining an extension of exclusive rights through claims in a later
patent that are not patently distinct from claims in an earlier patent. The purpose
of it is to "prevent unjustified timewise extension of the right to exclude granted by
a patent no matter how the extension is brought about." Eli Lilly, 222 F.3d at 985.
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this obviousness, the court refused to comment as to whether the
suit was frivolous.6
Courts are hesitant to find an infringement suit frivolous
because the stakes of the case are so high.65 Note, however,
"[sluch unilateral conduct on behalf of the patent holder would
have a detrimental effect on competition in the market if the
market participants were few in number."66
II. ADMINISTRATIVE DELAY THROUGH THE FILING OF CITIZEN
PETITIONS
Citizen petitions are an administrative step toward legal
action against a generic manufacturer. 67 A citizen petition is the
procedural tool used by innovator firms to protect their brand
name products. 68 A citizen petition may be submitted by a
pioneer manufacturer to initiate an administrative proceeding.69
A party who files an administrative proceeding is requesting the
FDA to "issue, amend, or revoke a regulation or order or take or
The court found that Claim 1 of the Lilly's '895 patent, which pertains to a method
of treating depression in humans by administering a compound (and then describing
the formulation of the compound), and Claim 7 of the '549 patent, which claims a
method for administering the compound fluoxenthine hydrochloride, were
essentially the same. Both claims relate to the same compound, and therefore the
patents are essentially the same-the only difference was the wording. See id. at
985-87. The Court invalidated Claim 7 of the '549 patent, which was due to expire
in 2003.
6 The infringement suit helped Eli Lilly keep its exclusivity on Prozac while it
was preparing for newer versions of the drug, which have separate patents, to
become available. Eli Lilly is planning on releasing a once a week version of Prozac,
and just recently released a version of Prozac that is patented to treat severe
menstrual cramps in females. This drug is be marketed under the name Sarafem.
See Melody Peterson, Lilly Set Back in Patent Case Over Prosac, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
10, 2000, at C1. These drugs will help absorb the revenue loss when a generic
version of Prozac becomes available. See id.
65 See Merck & Co. v. Mylan Pharm., 79 F. Supp. 2d 552, 558 (E.D. Pa. 2000)
("Merck's infringement claim, albeit erroneous, was not baseless. Its course of
conduct in pursuing the claim was neither vexatious, unusual nor disproportionate
to the rather high stakes involved."). See generally Resek, supra note 43. The "high
stakes" the court was referring to the minions of dollars at stake in both the
litigation itself and the continued exclusivity of the patent. Id.
6 Davis, supra note 45, at 371.
67 See Molzon, supra note 27, at 280.
68 See id. (finding that legal action can significantly delay the introduction of a
generic drug as well as add to the costs of production); see also 21 C.F.R. § 10.30
(2000).
69 See Molzon, supra note 27.
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refrain from taking any other form of administrative action."70 A
pioneer company may submit a citizen petition requesting
increased testing to assure greater bioequivalence or safety.71
The purpose of a pioneer manufacturer's submission of a citizen
petition may be to "create more difficult scientific and economic
hurdles for generic firms to overcome."72 The petition is often
submitted shortly before a pioneer's product patent is due to
expire.73 In response, a generic firm may submit a citizen
petition objecting to the requirements requested by the pioneer
manufacturer.74
The FDA may respond to a citizen petition in one of three
ways: it may approve the petition,75 deny the petition,76 or
provide a tentative response, indicating why the agency has been
unable to reach a decision on the petition.77 Whichever decision
the FDA reaches, the ultimate result is the same-delaying the
approval of an ANDA in an attempt to extend the exclusivity
period of a pioneer drug.
Il. COLLUSION BETWEEN PIONEER AND GENERIC DRUG
COMPANIES
The Hatch-Waxman Act78 served to decrease the market
share that a pioneer drug has once its patent expires. "When the
Act was passed in 1984, generic drug companies held eight
percent of the market. By 1989, however, the generic drug
companies' market share had increased to thirty-three
percent."79 This has led the companies to implement extreme
measures to retain their market share. Pioneer companies
70 21 C.F.R. § 10.30 (2000). An interested person, which the pioneer company is
considered, may submit a citizen's petition in the approval of an ANDA.
71 See Molzon, supra note 27, at 281.
72 Id.
73 See id.
74 See id.
75 See 21 C.F.R. § 10.30(e)(2)(i) (2000).
76 Id. § 10.30(e)(2)(ii).
77 Id. § 10.30(e)(2)(iii).
78 Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub L.
No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 68b-68c, 70b (1994); 21
U.S.C. §§ 301, 355, 360cc (1994); 28 U.S.C. 2201 (1994); 35 U.S.C. §§ 156, 271, 282
(1994)).
79 Davis, supra note 45, at 365. There are other factors that contributed to this
increase, including the expiration of a large number of patents on widely prescribed
drugs during this period. See id.
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collude with generics as a market control strategy to prevent
competition.8 0
Four drug companies have recently come under fire for
delaying the sale of generic drugs.81 The companies involved are
Andrx Corporation and Hoechst A.G., for a deal involving
Cardizem, and Abbott Laboratories and Geneva
Pharmaceuticals, for a deal involving Hytrin.8 2 They are accused
of entering into agreements wherein the pioneer company would
pay the generic company in exchange for not releasing the
generic version of the drug, enabling the pioneer to keep its
market share.8 3 These tactics may violate antitrust laws by
substantially reducing competition and creating monopolies.84
In 1998, Abbott Laboratories, the manufacturer of Hytrin, a
brand name high blood pressure medication, entered into an
agreement with Geneva Pharmaceuticals, a generic drug maker
seeking to market terazonin, a generic version of Hytrin.8 5
Under the terms of the agreement, Abbott would pay Geneva
$4.5 million a month not to produce the generic version of the
drug.86 A similar deal was struck between Andrx and Hoechst
A.G. over the generic version of Cardizem CD, one of the nation's
top-selling heart drugs.87 Hoechst agreed to pay Andrx $100
million a year to withhold the release of its generic version of the
drug.88 Fear of antitrust investigation forced these companies to
abandon the agreements.8 9
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) filed complaints
against these companies regarding the delays.9 0 In In Re:
80 See id. at 357.
81 See Peterson, supra note 64, at C8.
82 See id.
8 See id.
84 See Davis, supra note 45, at 357.
8 See Petersen, supra note 81.
86 See Stolberg & Gerth, supra note 1, at 1. This was not the first such deal
made by Abbott. The day before the deal with Geneva, Abbott made a similar deal
with Zenith Goldline Pharmaceuticals. To settle out of patent court, Abbott agreed
to pay Zenith $2 million a month, up to a maximum of $42 million.
87 See Petersen, supra note 64.
88 See id.
89 See id. The generic version of Hytrin became available in August 1999, more
than a year after Geneva's ANDA was approved. After the deal was dissolved,
Geneva successfully defended a patent infringement case brought by Abbott. See
Abbott Lab. v. Geneva Pharm., 182 F.3d 1315, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
9D The matter between Geneva and Abbott was handled administratively. The
complaints are available online at http'//www.ftc.gov/os/2000/O5/abbott
[Vol.75:357
20011 PROMOTING DRUG AVAILABILITY
Cardizem CD Antitrust Litigation,91 the court found that the
agreement between Hoechst and Andrx was an unreasonable
restraint of trade and was per se invalid under § 1 of the
Sherman Antitrust Act.92
The essential elements of a violation of § 1 of the Sherman
Act include a (1) contract, combination, or conspiracy, (2) which
affects interstate commerce and (3) imposes an "unreasonable"
restraint on trade.93 The courts use two methods to analyze
whether an agreement is a violation of the Act. The first method
is a per se approach, the second is a rule of reason approach.94 A
per se approach is used if the agreement involves practices, such
as horizontal price fixing among competitors, which are
inherently anti-competitive. 95 Such agreements are considered
per se invalid without an inquiry into the actual harm caused.9 6
The court in In Re: Cardizem determined that the agreement
was horizontal9 7 and thus per se invalid. In other words, the
court found that the agreement between Hoechst and Andrx
restricted competition, allocated the entire U.S. market for
Cardizem and its bioequivalent to Hoechst, and allowed Hoechst
to maintain or fix the price of Cardizem at a non-competitive
level during the life of the agreement.98
genevacomp.htm (last visited October 1, 2000).
91 105 F. Supp. 2d 682 (E.D. Mich. 2000).
92 See id. at 706. Congress passed the Sherman Antitrust Act in 1890. It is a
broad statute enacted to promote competition by suppressing monopolistic trade
practices. See 54 AM. JUR. 2D Monopolies, Restraints of Trade, and Unfair Trade
Practices § 1 (1996).
93 In Re: Cardizem, 105 F. Supp. 2d at 692 (quoting White & White, Inc. v.
American Hosp. Supply Corp., 723 F.2d 495, 504 (6th Cir. 1983)).
9 See In Re: Cardizem, 105 F. Supp. 2d at 692. The "rule of reason" approach
asks the fact finder to decide whether under all of the circumstances of the case the
restrictive practice imposes an unreasonable restraint of trade. See id. (quoting
Betkerur v. Aultman Hosp. Ass'n, 78 F.3d 1070, 1088 (6th Cir. 1996)).
95 See id. "An agreement is illegal per se when the restraint of trade has no
legitimate justification, lacks any redeeming competitive purpose and 'would always
or almost always tend to restrict competition and decrease output.'" Resek, supra
note 43, at 578.
96 See id. at 579. "When an alleged agreement is illegal per se, no facts need be
proven beyond the making of an agreement." Id.
9 "An arrangement is said to be horizontal when (1) its participants are either
actual rivals at the time the agreement is made or (b) potential rivals at the time
the agreement is made; and (2) the agreement eliminates some avenue of rivalry
among participants." In re: Cardizem, 105 F. Supp. 2d at 700 (quoting 11 H.
Hovenkmmp, Antitrust Law: An Analysis of Antitrust Principles and Their
Application, P 1901 at 185 (1998)).
98 See In re: Cardizem, 105 F. Supp. 2d at 705.
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This agreement prevented any other generic manufacturers
from marketing a generic version of Cardizem. BioVail, another
generic manufacturer, filed an ANDA with the FDA but was
prevented from obtaining preliminary FDA approval because
Andrx's 180 day exclusivity period had not yet been triggered
and therefore had not expired. 99 Andrx's exclusivity period had
not yet expired because under the agreement between Hoechst
and Andrx, Andrx would not market the drug, so there would be
no "commercial marketing trigger," and there was no patent
litigation, so there would be no "court decision trigger."100 The
agreement, had it continued, would have essentially prevented a
generic version of Cardizem from being available at market. 10'
IV. POSSIBLE REFORMS TO THE HATCH-WxmAN ACT
One of the most common complaints about the Hatch-
Waxman Act involves the drafting of the Act.102 Those who have
commented on the drafting have labeled it "vague,"
"complicated," and "unclear."10 3 This inelegant drafting has led
to a number of problems applying the Act and effectuating its
purpose. 0 4 These problems need to be addressed to ensure that
consumers have speedy access to generic drugs once the patent
on the brand name has expired. Congress has realized that
there are problems and loopholes in the statute that must be
addressed, and the 106th Congress has proposed a bill to address
some of these problems. 10 5
99 See Biovail v. Hoechst Aktiengesellschaft, Inc., 49 F. Supp. 2d 750, 757
(D.N.J. 1999).
100 See Resek, supra note 43, at 575.
101 The next section of this Note discusses the problems associated with the
180-day exclusivity period, as well as proposed reforms to this period.
102 See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661 (1990). Justice Scalia
opinioned that "[n]o interpretation we have been able to imagine can transform...
[it] into an elegant piece of statutory draftsmanship." Id. at 679. He went on to
explain that the statute is "not plainly comprehensible on anyone's view." Id. at 669;
see also Mova Pharm. Corp. v. Shalala, 140 F.3d 1060, 1069 (D.C. Cir. 1998)
(quoting other courts referring to the Act as "cumbersome" and "very confusing and
ambiguous").
103 Part of the reason that it is so confusing is that it is a compromise between
the pioneer companies and the generic companies. "A combination of mutual
mistrust and fears about the uncertain economic impact of making generic drugs
more readily available led to the creation of a law which was inelegantly drafted
and extremely complex." Engelberg, supra note 21, at 391-92 (footnote omitted).
I04 See id.
105 See H.R. 5247, 106th Cong., 2d Sess. (2000). The bill is to be cited as the
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A. 180-Day Exclusivity Period
The biggest problem in effectuating the purposes of the
Hatch-Waxman Act has been the 180-day exclusivity period
granted to the first generic manufacturer to file an ANDA.106
The Act provides two "trigger" points for the beginning of the
exclusivity period-a "commercial marketing" trigger and a
"court decision" trigger.10 7  Applying the statute, the FDA
believed that the period was triggered by the first substantially
complete AJNDA with a paragraph certification challenging the
patent and had to successfully defend the patent suit brought by
the innovator drug company. 08  In Mova Pharm. Corp. v.
Shalala,0 9 however, the United States Court of Appeals changed
this interpretation.110
The court in Mova Pharm. Corp. found that the FDA's
interpretation of the statute imposed a "successful defense
requirement," which was not what Congress had intended in
drafting the statute.'1 Subsequent to Mova Pharm. Corp., the
FDA issued a guidance document interpreting the statute to say
that one need not be sued to obtain exclusivity." 2 This provision
of the Act should be amended" 3 to make it clear that an
applicant who makes a paragraph IV certification need not
successfully defend a patent infringement suit in order to trigger
the exclusivity period.
The interpretation of the term "court" in the court decision
trigger of the exclusivity period is yet another problem in the
statute. 114 Which court decision triggers the exclusivity period?
The district court? The court of appeals? The Supreme Court?
"Greater Access to Affordable Pharmaceuticals Act" or the "GAAP Act of 2000."
106 See Dickinson, supra note 50, at 199.
107 See Resek, supra note 43, at 575.
108 See Dickinson, supra note 50, at 199.
109 140 F.3d 1060 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
110 See id. at 1066.
M Id. The court noted that the FDA's interpretation would lead to bizarre
results in (1) cases where the first ANDA applicant is not sued, and (2) cases in
which the first ANDA applicant loses its suit.
112 See FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY-180-DAY GENERIC
DRUG EXCLUSIVITY UNDER THE HATCH-WAXMAN AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL
FOOD, DRUG, & COSMETIC ACT 63 Fed. Reg. 37890 (June 1998).
113 See 21 U.S.C. § 355 (j)(5)(B)(iv) (1994).
114 Currently, 21 U.S.C. § 355 (j)(5)(B)(iv)(II) states that the period is triggered
on "the date of a decision of a court... holding the patent which is the subject of the
certification to be invalid or not infringed." Id. (emphasis added).
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Two cases have addressed this issue and determined that the
word "court" should be interpreted as the first court that finds
the patent in question to be invalid, unenforceable, or not
infringed. 115 The proposed bill has not adopted these versions116
and states that "court" means a court "from which no appeal can
or has been taken."117
The last problem of the 180-day exclusivity period is the
situation that occurred in In re: Cardizem18 and a problem that
Judge Wald warned against in Mova.119  If a generic
manufacturer colludes with a pioneer manufacturer and never
markets the drug or defends a patent litigation suit, the
exclusivity period may never be triggered. There must be a
safeguard in the statute to prevent this restraint of trade and to
ensure that the period will be triggered.12 0  The proposed
legislation has addressed this problem by amending the trigger
provisions of the act to state that "if the (paragraph
IV)... applicant fails to commence commercial marketing of its
drug product once its application is made effective..." the
period will become available to the next generic applicant. 121
This amendment will hopefully serve as a disincentive for both
generic and pioneer drug manufacturers to collude.
B. Frivolous Patent Infringement Suits
The fear in imposing sanctions for frivolous lawsuits is that
the cost of the sanction will either be passed down to the
consumer, further increasing health costs, or, in the alternative,
will have the effect of decreasing the essential research
conducted by the pioneer companies. There is no simple answer
to this problem. Stays should be determined on a case-by-case
basis. There should not be an automatic 30-month stay. An
115 See Mylan Pharm., Inc. v. Shalala, 81 F. Supp. 2d 30 (D.D.C. 2000).
116 See H.R. 5247, 106th Cong., 2d Sess. (2000).
17 Id.
118 See In re: Cardizem, 105 F. Supp. 2d at 682, 686 (E.D. Mich. 2000); see also
supra notes 90-98 and accompanying text.
119 See Mova Pharm. Corp. v. Shalala, 140 F.3d 1060, 1066 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
120 The Coalition for Pharmaceutical Reform has been urging a reform of the
180-day exclusivity period. See Driving Up Drug Prices, N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 2000,
at A22. The FTC proposed that the companies should be forced to pay the amount of
income generated as a result of the increased prices. Some have called this approach
"unusual" and "aggressive" but it may be an effective deterrent. See Reid, supra
note 2, at 338.
121 H.R. 5247, 106th Cong., 2d Sess. (2000).
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examination of the merits should determine the length of the
stay, if any is to be granted. Perhaps there should also be a good
faith requirement for pioneer companies filing patent
infringement suits. There have been proposals that suggest that
those who have been convicted of illegal activities relating to
development or approval should be banned from submitting drug
applications. 122 Opponents to these proposals argue that it is
exclusively directed at the generic drug industry and that it will
effectively deprive consumers of life-saving drugs.123 While these
suggestions may help, there is no definitive answer. The
importance of pharmaceuticals in this country leaves many
citizens at the mercy of these manufacturers.
The FTC has proposed a study to examine both the 30-
month stay and the 180-day marketing exclusivity period.124 The
focus of the study would be to see whether these provisions of the
Act have encouraged generic competition or facilitated the use of
anti-competitive strategies. 125
C. Citizen Petitions
Pioneer drug companies should be prevented from filing
Citizen Petitions relating to the approval of an ANDA. These
petitions should be reserved for those who have a non-
commercial interest in the drug. The proposed legislation would
amend 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5) to include a provision stating that
the filing of a Citizen Petition "shall not.., delay review and
approval of [an ANDA,]" unless the petition demonstrates that
approval would pose a threat to public health and safety.126
= See H.R. 4810, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990).
Im See Lewis, supra note 26, at 377.
124 See Press Release: FTC to Study Generic Competition, Oct. 11, 2000,
available at http-//www.ftc/gov/opa/2000/10/genericdrug.htm (visited July 12, 2000).
12 See id.
26 H.R. 5247, 106th Cong., 2d Sess. (2000).
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CONCLUSION
The Hatch-Waxman Act has been effective. 127 Once hailed
as the "most important consumer bill of the decade," 128 the Act
has helped consumers have greater access to cheaper, generic
versions of life-saving drugs.129 More can be done. As loopholes
in the Act emerge, Congress must take action to ensure that the
public is not being cheated. 30 The proposed legislation by
Congress, as well as the proposed study by the FTC, are both
comprehensive measures that can benefit consumers.
127 The 1996 Senate Judiciary Committee Hearings declared that the Act was
healthy. Generic drug industry representatives claimed that the Act "isn't broke"
and "doesn't need fixing." A noted economist stated that "in terms of facilitating
generic competition, the Act had clearly been a tremendous success." There was
criticism however of the act by the pioneer industry. See Pharmaceutical Patent
Issues: Interpreting GATT: Hearings on S. 1277 Before the Senate Judiciary Comm.,
104th Cong. (1996) (Statement of John Klein, Chairman, Generic Pharmaceutical
Industry Ass'n.); see also Lewis, supra note 26, at 377; Reid, supra note 2, at 331.
128 S. REP. No. 104-394, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. (1996) (report submitted by of
one of the original sponsors of the Act, Sen. Orrin Hatch).
129 See GphA Reports Consumers Will Save $100 Billion Through Improved
Access to Generic Pharmaceuticals, U.S. NEWSWIRE, Sept. 19, 2000. A "report by the
Managed Care Institute of Samford University states that every one percent
increase in generic drug utilization results in savings of $1.16 billion." Id.
130 See Congressional Press Release, Generic Medicine More Accessible, Sept.
27, 2000.
